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Modal fictionalism is a term used in philosophy, and more specifically in the metaphysics of modality, to describe the position that holds that modality can be analysed in terms of a fiction about possible worlds. The theory comes in two versions: Strong and Timid. Both positions were first exposed by Gideon Rosen starting from 1990.〔Gideon Rosen, Modal Fictionalism, Mind, 99, 395 (1990), pp. 327-54.〕 ==Strong Fictionalism about Possible Worlds== According to Strong fictionalism about possible worlds (another name for Strong modal fictionalism), the following bi-conditionals are necessary and specify the truth-conditions for certain cases of modal claims: # It is possible that P iff the translation of P into the language of a fiction F (containing possible worlds) holds according to F. # It is necessary that P iff the translation of P into the language of a fiction F (containing possible worlds) always holds. Recent supporters of this view added further specifications of these bi-conditionals to counter certain objections. In the case of claims of possibility, the revised bi-conditional is thus spelled out: (1.1) it is possible that P iff At this universe, presently, the translation of P into the language of a fiction F holds according to F.〔Seahwa Kim, 'Modal Fictionalism and Analysis', in Mark Kalderon (ed.) Fictionalism in Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 116-33.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Modal fictionalism」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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